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Abstract—Drones will have extensive use cases across various
commercial, government, and military sectors, ranging from
delivery of consumer goods to search and rescue operations.
To maintain safety and security of people and infrastructure,
it becomes critically important to quickly and accurately
detect non-cooperating drones. In this paper we formulate a
received signal strength (RSS) based detector, leveraging the
existing wireless infrastructures that might already be serving
other devices. Thus the detector can detect the presence of a
drone signal buried in radio frequency (RF) interference and
thermal noise, in a mixed line-of-sight (LOS) and non-LOS
(NLOS) environment. We develop analytical expressions for the
probability of false alarm and the probability of detection of a
drone, which quantify the impact of aggregate interference and
air-to-ground (A2G) propagation characteristics on the detection
performance of individual sensors. We also provide analytical
expressions for average network probability of detection, which
capture the impact of sensor density on a network’s detection
coverage. Finally, we find the critical sensor density that
maximizes the average network probability of detection for a
given requirement of probability of false alarm.
Index Terms—Aggregate interference amplitude, LOS/NLOS,
nearest neighbor, PPP, stochastic geometry, drone detection,
UTM.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the widespread use cases of drones across
military, commercial, and government sectors, detection and
surveillance of drones is emerging as a critically important and
challenging problem. Depending on the context, a drone may
or may not cooperate in the detection process, either because
the drone’s communication system might not be designed
for it, or it may be an unauthorized, non-cooperating, and
potentially malicious drone [1], [2]. Even though there are
several features of a drone’s radio frequency (RF) signal that
can be used for the porpose of detecting the drone, use of
the received signal strength (RSS) is particularly convenient
for the detection of unauthorized drones [3]. This is because
the RSS of the signal of interest (SOI) at a probe sensor
(see Fig. 1) can be measured without making unrealistic
assumptions, such as having synchronization between the
drone and the probe sensors, and having knowledge of drone
signal waveform at the probe sensor.
There are certain limitations of RSS-based drone detection,
which include the requirement for high signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) and susceptibility to RF interference [2]. Therefore,
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Fig. 1: The signal of interest (SOI) from the target drone and
the interference signals at the desired sensor.
interference caused by high density of mobile devices in urban
environments, combined with the diminished line-of-sight
(LOS) dominance, can severely degrade drone detection
performance. The LOS dominance of an air-to-ground (A2G)
link and the SNR of the SOI are respectively dependent on
the elevation angle and the link distance of the A2G link,
which in turn are dependent on the spatial placement of the
sensors in the network with respect to the drone location. As
the aggregate interference magnitude is also a function of the
spatial node density, it is important to analyze the detection
performance of drones in a realistic urban environment with
multiple sensors/interferers having mixed LOS and non-LOS
(NLOS) propagation characteristics.
There have been various works in the literature that
study the coverage probability of a cellular network for
ground users considering a Poisson field of interferers [4]–[7].
However, none of these studies consider specific propagation
characteristics and interference geometries that are unique to
aerial links. In a different line of work, passive RF sensing
techniques have been considered for the purpose of detection,
classification, and tracking of drones, regardless of whether
the drone is cooperating or not [1], [2], [8]–[10]. However,
these studies are limited to experimental efforts, and they
do not aim to characterize the impact of sensor density and
network interference on the detection performance. To the best
of our knowledge, a theoretical framework that captures the
impact of aggregate interference amplitude in conjunction with
the A2G propagation characteristics is missing. In [11], [12]
the authors develop an amplitude based analysis of aggregate
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interference that characterizes the symbol error probability
and the outage probability for terrestrial links. Impact of
the aggregate interference amplitude on the GNSS signal
acquisition performance is analyzed in [13]. However, this
analysis does not consider multiple sensors, and does not
account for a mixed LOS/NLOS A2G links.
In this paper we formulate an RSS-based detector for a
typical RF sensor that belongs to a network of RF sensors
and detects the presence of a mixed LOS/NLOS A2G link,
considering a Poisson field of RF interferers in a suburban
or urban environment. Analytical expressions are provided for
the probability of detection and the probability of false alarm.
We then derive the average network probability of detection
as a measure of the detection coverage performance of the
sensor network. Our results show that the average detection
probability over the network changes in a non-monotonic
pattern with respect to the sensor density, and that there exists
a critical sensor density for which it gets maximized. Finally,
we formulate and numerically solve a constrained nonlinear
optimization problem in order find the critical sensor density
for a given false alarm requirement.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Spatial Distribution of Sensors, Interferers, and Drones
We model the network of ground RF sensors as a stationary
homogeneous Poisson point process (PPP) ΦB with a density λ
(per m2) in the 2-D Euclidean plane. We define the interferers
as the active devices in the vicinity of ΦB, transmitting within
the same frequency band, during the time interval of interest.
For example, if cellular base stations (BSs) are used as ground
sensors, only one active uplink user/interferer can be scheduled
on a given time-frequency resource. In order to approximate
the distribution of the aggregate interference, we model the
locations of the active user equipments (UEs) tagged to the
network of the BSs, as an independent homogeneous stationary
PPP, ΦU, with the same density λ (per m2) [6]. We also assume
that a typical probe sensor is located at the origin (0, 0) as
in Fig. 2. In Fig. 1, we show that the SOI is comprised of
the drone signal and the aggregate interference of uplink UE
signals.
The PPP process ΦU for the interferers and the UEs is
stationary, and the aggregate interference signal at any location
(x, y) therefore converges to the aggregate interference at the
origin (0, 0) in distribution [7]. Due to the conducive impacts
of higher elevation angle and smaller A2G link distance on the
detection performance, we consider the detection of drones by
the nearest sensor. The respective distribution of the horizontal
link distance R0 is given as
fR0(r0) = 2piλr0 exp(−λpir02), (1)
which is a Rayleigh distribution with the scale parameter σ2 =
1
piλ . We assume that the drone flies at a constant altitude of h
meters. The distances of the interferers to the probe receiver
is denoted as [Ri]∞i=1, where Rk ≤ R` with k < `.
B. Propagation Channels for SOI and Aggregate Interference
The A2G links usually tend to have a LOS component,
giving rise to a mixed LOS/NLOS channel. The probability
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Fig. 2: The problem of drone detection in a Poisson field of
sensors and interferes.
of having a LOS path in an A2G channel is usually larger
than that for terrestrial channels, due to lower availability of
scattering and blocking objects. Thus in this paper we model
the probe link to be of mixed LOS/NLOS nature depending
on the elevation angle of the A2G link, whereas the interfering
links between the UEs and the probe receiver is considered to
be predominantly NLOS. For the characterization of the mixed
LOS/NLOS A2G probe link, we adopt the model in [14],
which represents the total path loss in an A2G link as the
sum of the free space path loss and an additional path loss
(η) due to the reflections, scattering and shadowing in the
environment. The state (LOS/NLOS) of an A2G link is defined
as ζ ∈ {L,N}, and the corresponding additional path losses
are defined as ηN > ηL. The probability of having a LOS path
is defined as a function of the elevation angle of the A2G link:
PL(r0) = 1
1 + a exp
{
−b
[
180
pi tan
−1( hr0 )− a
]} , (2)
where a and b are constants which depend on the environment,
and PN (r0) = 1 − PL(r0). In this paper we consider two
different environments, namely, suburban (SU) and urban
(U), in the order of decreasing LOS dominance. For the
interfering links, we consider a higher path loss exponent (γI ∈
[2.13, 4.89] [15]), and Rayleigh multipath fading, introducing
a random normalized amplitude gain α ∼ Rayleigh(σ2 = 12 ),
and a random phase φ ∼ U [0, 2pi] to the received signal [16].
We also consider an amplitude loss factor αs = eσsG for
the interfering links due to log-normal shadowing, where
G ∼ N (0, 1), and σs is the shadowing coefficient [12].
C. Transmission Characteristics of Drones and Interferers
For sake of brevity, we assume that all the interfering
UEs transmit the same power Pu, and the transmit power
of the drone is Pd. We do not assume any information of
the transmit waveforms of the interfering UEs and the drone
at the probe sensor. In addition, we also do not require the
interfering UEs and the drone to be synchronized with the
probe receiver sensor, which is reflected by a random delay
τi ∼ U [0, T ] with respect to the probe receiver, within the
symbol period T , set at the probe receiver. The consequences
of the lack of synchronization and knowledge of UE and
drone waveforms is modeled through a random variable (r.v.)
ρ ∼ U [0, 1] representing the cross correlation between the Tx
and Rx waveforms. Thus the passband transmit signal for the
drone and at each interfering UE are given as
xd(t) =
√
2Pdgd(t− τ) cos(2pifct+ θd) , (3)
xui(t) =
√
2Pugu(t− τi) cos(2pifct+ θui) , (4)
where, fc is the center frequency, θd, θui ∈ [0, 2pi] are arbitrary
phases, and gd(t) and gu(t) are respectively the unit-energy
signal waveforms used by the drone and the UEs. We also
assume that the drone and the UE signals are narrowband, i.e.
fc  1T .
III. DETECTION AND RECEIVED SIGNAL DISTRIBUTIONS
A. Binary Hypotheses Test
Our objective in this section is to formulate an RSS based
detector to detect any change in the distribution of the total
RSS due to the presence of an A2G link, which assumes that
the statistical properties of the terrestrial and A2G channels are
quite different. We therefore treat the drone detection problem
as a binary hypotheses testing problem. We assume that while
the null hypothesis H0 corresponds to the signal reception
that is only composed of the aggregate interference Y (t) and
the thermal noise N(t), the alternative hypothesis H1 assumes
also the involvement of SOI Z(t) transmitted by the drone. We
therefore describe the respective hypotheses testing problem as
follows
H0 : R(t) = Y (t) +N(t), (5)
H1 : R(t) = Z(t) + Y (t) +N(t), (6)
where N(t) is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with
two-sided power spectral density N02 .
B. Passband Received Signal Representation
The aggregate interfering signal at the RF front end of a
generic probe receiver can be given as [11]:
Y (t) = kI
√
2Pu
∞∑
i=1
αiαsigu(t− τi)
Ri
bI
cos(2pifct+ θui + φi) ,
where bI = γI2 , kI =
(
c
4pifc
)bI
, and {αi}, {φi}, {αsi}, and
{τi} are sequence of independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d) r.v’s. The received drone signal Z(t), in terms of its
NLOS component, ZN(t) and LOS component ZL(t) is:
Z(t) =
{
ZN(t) + ZL(t), PZt(zt) = PL(R0),∀t ∈ [0, T ]
ZN(t), PZt(zt) = PN (R0),∀t ∈ [0, T ]
,
ZN(t) =
M∑
m=1
kαm
d
√
2Pd
ηN
gd(t− τ) cos(2pifct+ θd + φm),
ZL(t) =
k
d
√
2Pd
ηL
gd(t− τ) cos(2pifct+ θd),
where k = c4pifc , d =
√
R0
2 + h2 is the A2G link distance,
M is the total number of multipath components, αm and φm
are respectively the random amplitude gain, and phase delay
for the mth propagation path, such that, {αm}, {φm} are i.i.d
in m. The amplitude and the phase of the LOS component
remain unaffected by the multipath fading.
C. Baseband Received Signal Representation
After downcoversion, the probe receiver correlates the
baseband received signal with a unit energy signal waveform
g(t), to obtain the in-phase and quadrature (I-Q) components.
This is equivalent to projecting the received random process
R(t) onto a set of orthonormal basis functions: {fI(t) =√
2g(t) cos(2pifct), fQ(t) = −
√
2g(t) sin(2pifct)}, where the
signal energy,
´ T
0
g2(t) dt = 1. Using complex baseband
notation, we can write:
R = Z + Y +N , (7)
where R = RI+jRQ, Rn =
´ T
0
R(t)fn(t) dt for n ∈ {I,Q},
and N = NI + jNQ, is a circularly symmetric (CS) Gaussian
r.v. After some algebraic manipulation [see Appendix. A],
Z = ZI + jZQ can be expressed as:
Z =

kρ
√
Pde
jθd
√
ηN d
∑M
m=1 αme
jφm , PZ(z) = PN (R0),
kρ
√
Pde
jθd
√
ηN d
[∑M
m=1 αme
jφm +
√
ηN√
ηL
]
, PZ(z) = PL(R0),
(8)
where ρ is the correlation between gd(t) and g(t). Without loss
of generality, we assume ρ ∼ U [0, 1]. Similarly, Y = YI+jYQ
is given as follows:
Y =
∞∑
i=1
kIαiρie
σsGi
Ri
bI
√
Pue
j(θui+φi) =
∞∑
i=1
Ui
Ri
bI
, (9)
where ρi is the correlation coefficient for each UE’s signal at
the probe receiver.
D. Distribution of the SOI and the Aggregate Interference
For a sufficiently large value of M , due to the central
limit theorem, the summation term in (8) becomes a CS
complex Gaussian r.v. [16]:
∑M
m=1 αme
jφm ,∼ Nc(0, 1). Thus
the distributions of ZI and ZQ, conditioned on ρ, R0, and the
state of the A2G link, ζ ∈ {L,N}, are given as follows:
ZI
|L,R0∼ N
(
kρ
√
Pd cos θd√
ηLd
,
k2ρ2Pd
2ηNd2
)
, (10)
ZQ
|L,R0∼ N
(
kρ
√
Pd sin θd√
ηLd
,
k2ρ2Pd
2ηNd2
)
, (11)
Z
|N ,R0∼ Nc
(
0,
k2ρ2Pd
ηNd2
)
. (12)
For simplicity we assume ρ = 1, and thus the above equations
are not shown to be explicitly conditioned on ρ.
In order to derive the distribution of the aggregate
interference amplitude in (9), we note that Ui is a series of i.i.d
CS complex Gaussian r.v.’s [see Appendix. B], and [Ri]∞i=1 is
defined with respect to a PPP. Thus Y becomes a CS stable
r.v. [11], [12], [17], Y ∼ Sc (αY, βY, γY), where αY = 2bI ,
βY = 0, and γY = piλC−12
bI
E
{
|Uin|
2
bI
}
, and n ∈ {I,Q}.
For simplicity we assume ρi = 1, and using the moment
properties of the corresponding r.v.’s, we obtain the following
expression [see Appendix. B]
E
{
|Uin|
2
bI
}
= kI
2
bI Pu
1
bI e
2σs
2
bI Γ(1 +
1
bI
)ξ(bI) , (13)
where ξ(bI) is only a function of the amplitude loss exponent,
bI. Using moment properties of uniform r.v., for bI =
2, 1.5, 1.75 the numerical values of ξ(bI) become 0.637,
0.579, and 0.7403, respectively. Next, using the decomposition
property (Y =
√
VG) of stable r.v.’s [17], Y becomes a CS
complex Gaussian r.v. conditioned on the r.v. V . This helps us
to simplify our analysis to a conditional Gaussian scenario:
Y
|V∼ Nc (0, 2V γG) , (14)
where V and G are independent r.v.’s, and distributed as
V ∼ S (αV, βV, γV) , (15)
G ∼ Nc (0, 2γG) , (16)
where αV = 1bI , βV = 1, γV = cos
pi
2bI
, and γG = 2(γY)bI .
E. Distribution of the Composite Received Signal
Finally, using the distributions of Z, Y , and N , we can
derive the distribution of the composite received signal. From
(6) and (14), and in the absence of a drone, the total signal
R = Y +N becomes a CS complex Gaussian r.v., given as:
H0 : R |V∼ Nc
(
0, 2σ0
2
)
, (17)
where σ02 = V γG + N02 .
When a drone is present, but the A2G link is purely NLOS
in nature, the total signal R = Z + Y +N also becomes a
CS complex Gaussian r.v., described as:
H1 : R |N ,V,R0∼ Nc
(
0, 2σ1
2
)
, (18)
where σ12 = k
2ρ2Pd
2ηN d2
+ V γG +
N0
2 .
However when the A2G link is mixed LOS/NLOS, RI and
RQ still remain Gaussian, but have different non-zero means:
H1 : RI |L,V,R0∼ N
(
µI, σ1
2
)
, (19)
H1 : RQ |L,V,R0∼ N
(
µQ, σ1
2
)
, (20)
where µI = kρ
√
Pd cos θd√
ηLd
, µQ = kρ
√
Pd sin θd√
ηLd
, and σ1 is the
same as in (18).
IV. ANALYSIS OF RSS-BASED DRONE DETECTION
Having derived the distribution of the I-Q components of
the received signal, we can now obtain the distribution of RSS,
and formulate a RSS based detector. We define the RSS, RS
as:
RS = RI
2 +RQ
2 . (25)
For a given requirement of PFA = αFA, the RSS based
detector decides H1, if RS > γthr, where the threshold, γthr
is found from (26):
PFA = EV
[
exp
(
− γthr
2(V γG +
N0
2 )
)]
= αFA . (26)
The above expression of PFA = P (RS ≥ rs;H0) is the value
of the null complimentary cumulative distribution function
(CCDF), F¯RS(rs;H0) at rs = γthr, where the RSS, RS, is
described as an un-normalized (σ0 6= 1) Chi-squared random
variable of degree 2 [see Appendix. C].
A. Individual Sensor Detection Performance
The detection performance of a single sensor in the
network is obtained by considering the horizontal distance,
R0, between the drone and the probe sensor to be a
known constant. The corresponding PD = P (RS ≥
rs;H1), for PFA = αFA, is given as the value of
the alternative CCDF, F¯RS(rs;H1) at rs = γthr (27).
In the alternative hypothesis, the RSS of the NLOS and
the LOS components are respectively described as an
un-normalized (σ1 6= 1) Chi-Squared r.v. of degree 2, and
an un-normalized non-central Chi-Squared r.v. of degree 2,
and Non-centrality parameter, k
2ρ2Pd
ηLd2
[see Appendix. C].
Thus the alternative CCDF, F¯RS(rs;H1), becomes a convex
combination of the corresponding LOS and NLOS CCDFs,
expressed respectively, in terms of the 1st order Marcum’s
Q-function, QM(), and the exponential function.
B. Average Network Detection Performance
In this work we assume that the network only uses the
sensor nearest to the drone for the detection purpose. Such an
assumption can be quite realistic in case of omnidirectional
transmissions, as for a given drone altitude, h, shorter
horizontal distance, r0 increases the SNR of the SOI, and
the LOS dominance of the A2G link, leading to higher PD.
The horizontal distance between the nearest sensor and the
drone, R0, can then be described as a Rayleigh distributed
r.v. with probability density function (PDF) as shown in (1).
Thus, regardless of the location of the drone, the average
network detection probability, PDavg(λ, γthr, h), is obtained by
integrating the detection probability of an individual sensor,
PD|R0(r0, λ, γthr, h) with respect to the PDF (1) of R0, and
is given as:
PDavg =
ˆ ∞
0
PD(r0)2piλr0 exp(−λpir02) dr0 . (28)
C. Critical PPP Density for Optimal Network Detection
As the density of sensors, λ increases, the average nearest
neighbor distance decreases, leading to lower average A2G
link distance and higher average elevation angle. This in turn
causes higher average SNR of the SOI, and increases the LOS
dominance in the A2G link. The increased probability of LOS,
combined with higher SNR, increases the impact of the non
centrality parameter, k
2ρ2Pd
ηN d2
of the alternative PDF, reducing
the overlap between the null and the alternative PDFs, which in
turn increases the probability of detection. However, increased
λ also increases the interferer density, which in turn increases
the dispersion (γG) of both the null and the alternative PDFs,
and leads to reduced probability of detection.
Due to such opposing effects of sensor density, on the
average network probability of detection, it is important to
investigate the behavior of PDavg with respect to λ, and find
the critical sensor density λc that optimizes the detection
performance. This can be mathematically described as:
λc = arg max
λ,γthr
PDavg (λ, γthr, h) ,
s.t. PFA(λ, γthr) = αFA . (29)
From the definition of PDavg and PFA in (28) and (26), we
realize that to obtain purely analytical expressions of PDavg
and PFA suitable for successfully framing an optimization
PD = EV
[
PL(r0)QM
(√
2ηNk2ρ2Pd
ηL(k2ρ2Pd + 2ηNd2(V γG + N02 ))
,
√
2γthrηNd2
k2ρ2Pd + 2ηNd2(V γG + N02 )
)]
+ EV
[
PN (r0) exp
(
− γthrηNd
2
k2ρ2Pd + 2ηNd2(V γG + N02 )
)]
. (27)
PDavg=
ˆ ∞
0
ˆ ∞
0
PL(r0)
√
piλr0
v−
3
2 exp(λpir02 +
1
4v )
QM
(√
2ηNk2ρ2Pd
ηL(k2ρ2Pd + 2ηNd2(vγG + N02 ))
,
√
2γthrηNd2
k2ρ2Pd + 2ηNd2(vγG + N02 )
)
dr0dv
+
ˆ ∞
0
ˆ ∞
0
PN (r0)
√
piλr0
v−
3
2 exp(λpir02 +
1
4v )
exp
(
− γthrηNd
2
k2ρ2Pd + 2ηNd2(vγG + N02 )
)
dr0dv. (32)
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Fig. 3: Single sensor ROCs for varying node densities, γI = 4,
h = 300 meters, and θ = 18◦.
problem, we need closed form PDF of the stable r.v. V . Closed
form PDFs for the stable family are only available for some
special cases. In our case, closed form PDF of V is only
available for bI = 2. In this case the distribution of V , in
(15), becomes a Levy distribution [17] V ∼ Levy(0, cos pi4 ),
and the PDF is given as:
fV(v) =
v−
3
2
2
√
pi
exp
(
− 1
4v
)
. (30)
Thus we attempt to find the optimal sensor density only for
the bI = 2 case, where the analytical expressions for PFA and
PDavg are given in (31), and (32):
PFA =
ˆ ∞
0
v−
3
2
2
√
pi
exp
(
− γthr
2(vγG +
N0
2 )
− 1
4v
)
dv. (31)
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide numerical results on the
impact of various spatial/network parameters and propagation
characteristics on the performance of the RSS based detector.
We evaluate the performance using the receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) curves, which illustrate PD as a function
of PFA. We assume Pu = Pd = 20 dBm, σs = 0, and
fc = 5.8 GHz, for all the plots shown in this section.
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Fig. 4: Single sensor ROCs for varying node densities, γI =
3.5, h = 300 meters, and θ = 18◦.
We also consider the thermal noise to be negligible for
all cases. We would like to note that the presented ROC
curves are semi-analytical in the sense that we employ the
analytical results obtained by (26), (27), and (28), and perform
Monte Carlo simulations with respect to the stable r.v. V .
Fig. 3 illustrates the impact of the sensor and the interferer
density λ on the detection performance of an individual sensor
in (27), for λ= {10−6, 10−5, 10−4}. We assume that the
horizontal distance between the probe receiver and the drone
is r0 = 923 m, the altitude of the drone is 300 m resulting in
an elevation angle of θ= 18◦, and γI = 4. We observe that the
PD for all PFA drops with increasing λ for both suburban and
urban environments. This is because any increase in λ also
increases the dispersion V γG of the aggregate interference,
which makes the spread of both null and alternative PDFs
larger. For the same λ, and PFA, PD in a suburban area is
higher than that in an urban area.
Fig. 4 depicts the impact of the node density on PD
assuming the same setup of Fig. 3, except with γI = 3.5. We
observe that PD for a fixed PFA decreases as the node density
λ increases. We also note that for a fixed PFA, and λ, the
PD achieved with γI = 3.5, is significantly lower than that for
γI = 4. This can be explained by the fact that the dispersion
of the aggregate interference increases as path loss exponent
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Fig. 5: Single sensor ROCs for λ= 10−4, θ = 18◦, and γI = 4
for various drone heights.
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Fig. 6: Average network probability of detection in (32), as a
function of sensor/interferer density for γI = 4.
γI for the interfering links decreases, specifically γG ∝ λ
γI
2 .
Fig. 5 demonstrates the impact of drone altitude h on the
detection performance of an individual sensor. For a given
PFA, the PD at h= 300 m is higher than that for h= 600 m.
This behaviour is mainly due to the increasing A2G link
distance, d=
√
r02 + h2, which causes the SNR of the SOI
to decrease, and is reflected by a drop in the non-centrality
parameter of the alternative PDF, i.e., k
2ρ2Pd
ηLd2
. This, in turn,
results in a higher amount of overlap between the null and the
alternative PDFs. Although any increase in h also increases
the elevation angle tan−1( hr0 ) (of the A2G link), and hence
increases the LOS dominance of the link, this impact remains
secondary as compared to the impact of the link distance. Note
that increasing weight PL(r0) of the LOS PDF with a small
non-centrality parameter has a very diminishing effect on the
location of the mixture alternative PDF.
Fig. 6 illustrates the impact of the sensor and interferer
density, λ, on the average network detection probability PDavg
for a given false alarm requirement PFA. We observe that
PDavg changes in a non-monotonic pattern with respect to λ,
and the critical density, λc that maximizes PDavg is higher
for a higher requirement on PFA, in both suburban and urban
areas. The values of the critical densities shown in the plots
are obtained by numerically solving the constrained nonlinear
optimization problem in (29).
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work we introduce an analytical frame work that
allows us to study the performance of an RSS-based drone
detection scheme employed by a network of RF sensors, in
the presence of multiple interferes, in a mixed LOS/NLOS
environment. We also derive the average network probability
of detection, and note that the average probability of detection
changes in a non-monotonic manner with respect to the sensor
and the interferer density. Finally we find the critical sensor
density that optimizes the detection performance for a given
drone altitude and environment.
APPENDIX
A. Baseband Signal Representation
Following the same algebraic simplifications, used to obtain
(33), we can show that
ZQ =
M∑
m=1
kραm
√
Pd sin (φm + θd)
d
√
ηN
+
kρ
√
Pd sin (θd)
d
√
ηL
.
(34)
YI =
∞∑
i=1
kαiρie
σsGi
Ri
bI
√
Pu cos(θui + φi) . (35)
YQ =
∞∑
i=1
kαiρie
σsGi
Ri
bI
√
Pu sin(θui + φi) . (36)
B. Distribution of Aggregate Interference Amplitude
In this section we compute the quantities related to the
distribution of the aggregate interference amplitude, Y in (9).
From (9) we note that,
Ui = kI
√
Puαiρie
j(θui+φi)eσsGi . (37)
For Rayleigh fading, i.e. αi ∼ Rayleigh(σ2 = 12 ), and φi ∼U [0, 2pi], it has been shown [18] that
αiρie
j(θui+φi) ∼ Nc(0, E{αi2ρi2cos2 θui + φi}) . (38)
Since Gi ∼ N (0, 1), Ui also becomes a CS complex Gaussian
r.v., where the sequence {Ui} is i.i.d in i.
Using (37), for n ∈ {I,Q}, we now compute the following
quantity:
E
{
|Uin|
2
bI
}
= kI
2
bI Pu
1
bIE{|αi|
2
bI }E{|ρi|
2
bI }
× E{| cos (θui + φi)|
2
bI } E{|eσsGi | 2bI } (39)
Using moment properties of Rayleigh, Uniform, and log
normal random variables, we obtain: E
{
|Uin|
2
bI
}
=
k
2
bI Pu
1
bI Γ(1 + 1bI )
(
bI
2+bI
)
ξ(bI)e
2σs
bI .
where, ξ(bI) = E{| cos (θui + φi)|
2
bI }, is difficult to compute
in a general form for all values of bI. However using moment
relations of (θd + φui) ∼ U [0, 2pi], we obtain the required
numerical values for possible values of bI.
ZI =
ˆ T
0
Z(t)fI(t) dt
=
M∑
m=1
ˆ T
0
[
kαm
d
√
2Pd√
ηN
gd(t− τ) cos (2pifct+ θd + φm)×
√
2g(t) cos(2pifct)
]
dt
+
ˆ T
0
[
k
d
√
2Pd√
ηL
gd(t− τ) cos (2pifct+ θd)×
√
2g(t) cos (2pifct)
]
dt
=
M∑
m=1
2kαm
√
Pd
d
√
ηN

ˆ T
0
1
2
gd(t− τ)g(t) cos (θd + φm) dt+
ˆ T
0
1
2
gd(t− τ)g(t) cos (4pifct+ θd + φm) dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
≈ 0, for fcT  1

+
2k
√
Pd
d
√
ηL

ˆ T
0
1
2
gd(t− τ)g(t) cos (θd) dt+
ˆ T
0
1
2
gd(t− τ)g(t) cos (4pifct+ θd) dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
≈ 0, for fcT  1

=
M∑
m=1
kαm
√
Pd
d
√
ηnN
ˆ T
0
gd(t− τ)g(t) cos (θd + φm) dt+ k
√
Pd
d
√
ηL
ˆ T
0
gd(t− τ)g(t) cos (θd) dt
=
M∑
m=1
kαm cos (θd + φm)
√
Pd
d
√
ηnN
ˆ T
0
gd(t− τ)g(t) dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
=ρ
+
k cos (θd)
√
Pd
d
√
ηL
ˆ T
0
gd(t− τ)g(t) dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
=ρ
=
M∑
m=1
kραm
√
Pd cos (φm + θd)
d
√
ηN
+
kρ
√
Pd cos (θd)
d
√
ηL
(33)
C. CCDFs of RSS
In this section we derive the CCDFs and PDFs for the null
and alternative RSS distributions.
1) Null Distribution: From (17), we note that
H0 : RI
σ0
,
RQ
σ0
|V∼ N (0, 1) . (40)
We now define a r.v. X0, defined as below:
X0 =
RS
σ02
=
RI
2
σ02
+
RQ
2
σ02
, (41)
where, X0 conditioned on V , is distributed as a Chi-Squared
r.v. of degree 2: X0
|V∼ χ22, and it’s CCDF is given as below:
F¯X0(x0) = exp
(
−x0
2
)
. (42)
Using (40) and (42) we can obtain the CCDF of the null RSS
as below:
F¯RS|V (rs;H0) = P (RS ≥ rs) = P (X0 ≥
rs
σ02
) = exp
(
− rs
2σ02
)
.
(43)
Substituting σ12 = V γG + N02 and rs = γthr, in (43) yields
the expression for PFA in (26).
2) Alternative NLoS Distribution: Using (18), and
following completely analogous steps to those used for the
derivation of the null distribution, we can show that the
CCDF of the RSS in this case, is given as below:
F¯RS|N ,V (rs;H1) = exp
(
− rs
2σ12
)
. (44)
3) Alternative LoS Distribution: After scaling (19), and
(20), by σ1, we get the following:
H1 : RI
σ1
|V,R0∼ N
(
µI
σ1
, 1
)
. (45)
H1 : RQ
σ1
|V,R0∼ N
(
µQ
σ1
, 1
)
. (46)
We now define a r.v. X1, defined as below:
X1 =
RS
σ12
=
RI
2
σ12
+
RQ
2
σ12
. (47)
By substituting values of µI, and µQ, from (19), and (20),
into (45), and (46), we find that, X1 conditioned on V , is
distributed as a NonCentral Chi-Squared r.v. with degree 2 and
non-centrality parameter, a2 = k
2ρ2Pd
2σ12ηLd2
: X1
|V∼ χ ′22(a2 =
k2ρ2Pd
2σ12ηLd2
) and it’s CCDF in terms of Marcum’s Q function is
given as below [19]:
F¯X1(x1;H1) = Q
(
a =
kρ
√
Pd
σ1
√
ηLd
, b =
√
x1
)
(48)
=
ˆ ∞
√
x1
exp
{
−a
2 + u2
2
}
uI0(au) du , (49)
where I0() represents the Modified Bessel Function of the first
kind, and zero-order.
By performing simple change of variable, x1 = rsσ12 , in (49),
the CCDF of RSS, RS is given as following
F¯RS|L,V,R0(rs;H1) = Q
(
a =
kρ
√
Pd
σ1
√
ηLd
, b =
√
rs
σ1
)
. (50)
Finally the Alternative CCDF of RSS is a convex combination
of the CCDFs in (44) and (50).
F¯RS|V,R0(rs;H1) =
∑
ζ∈{L,N}
Pζ(R0)F¯RS|V,R0,ζ(rs;H1, ζ) .
(51)
Substituting a = kρ
√
Pd
σ1
√
ηLd
, σ12 = k
2ρ2Pd
2ηN d2
+ V γG +
N0
2 , and
rs = γthr, in (51) yields the expression for PD in (27).
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